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THE DEFINITION OF “FAMILY” IN MISSOURI LOCAL ZONING 
ORDINANCES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR 
RESTRICTIVE DEFINITIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
In January 2006, Fondray Loving and his fiancée, Olivia Shelltrack, 
purchased a five-bedroom, 2,300 square foot, single-family home in Black 
Jack, Missouri.1  Loving and Shelltrack intended to live in the home with their 
three children.2  Like many municipalities, Black Jack requires a homeowner 
to apply for and receive an occupancy permit in order to legally occupy a 
home.3  Accordingly, Loving and Shelltrack applied for a permit.4  However, 
their application was denied because they did not meet Black Jack’s definition 
of “family” as outlined in the city’s zoning ordinance.5  Loving, Shelltrack, and 
their three children did not meet Black Jack’s definition of “family” because 
they are not married and, although two of their children are the biological 
offspring of both Loving and Shelltrack, one child is the biological offspring of 
only Shelltrack.6  In response to the denial of their application, Loving and 
Shelltrack appealed the decision but were once again denied.7 
During the months of March, April, and May 2006, the Black Jack 
Planning and Zoning Commission recommended to the Black Jack City 
Council a revised definition of “family” to eliminate the adverse impact to 
Loving and Shelltrack and those similarly situated.8  However, the city council 
 
 1. Petition at 7, Loving v. City of Black Jack, No. 06CC-003157 (Mo. Cir. Ct. dismissed 
Sept. 29, 2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. CITY OF BLACK JACK, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 6, art. II, § 6-18, 118.1.6(a) 
(2007). 
 4. Petition, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. at 3.  Black Jack defined “family” as: “An individual or two (2) or more persons 
related by blood, marriage or adoption, or a group of not more than three (3) persons who need 
not be related by blood, marriage or adoption, living together as a single non-profit housekeeping 
unit in a dwelling unit.”  Id. (citing CITY OF BLACK JACK, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES app. c, § 
0.30(27) (2006)); see also Martha T. Moore, Parents, Kids Not Necessarily ‘Family’ Everywhere, 
USA TODAY, May 16, 2006, at 6A. 
 6. Petition, supra note 1, at 4. 
 7. Id. at 9. 
 8. Id.  The proposed revised definition of “family” included “[t]wo . . . unrelated 
individuals . . . plus any other persons related directly to either such individual by blood, 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
632 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:631 
voted 5-3 to reject the proposed revised definition.9  It appeared Loving and 
Shelltrack had three choices: (1) do not occupy the home; (2) continue to 
occupy the home and be subject to enforcement action and sanctions (fines 
and/or eviction);10 or (3) get married in order to meet Black Jack’s definition of 
“family.”  Loving and Shelltrack chose another option—they instituted suit 
against Black Jack claiming deprivation of due process, violation of equal 
protection, and violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act.11 
As a result of the impending lawsuit coupled with negative nationwide 
media treatment of the situation,12 Black Jack again put the matter in front of 
their city council.13  This time the council voted unanimously to revise Black 
Jack’s definition of “family.”14  The new definition of “family” allows Loving, 
Shelltrack, and their children, as well as other similarly composed families, to 
occupy single-family homes in Black Jack, Missouri. 15 
The situation in Black Jack illustrates a dilemma that local governments 
across the country face when promulgating land use legislation.  Local 
governments bear the responsibility to implement and enforce land use 
legislation that preserves the integrity of neighborhoods and communities (i.e. 
 
marriage, adoption or foster care relationship, living together as a single non-profit housekeeping 
unit in a dwelling unit.”  Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 10. 
 11. Petition, supra note 1, at 12–22. 
 12. Joel Currier, Unwed Parents Still Not Welcome, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 17, 
2006, at B1; P.J. Huffstutter, Unwed Couple, Kids Barred by Town Law, SEATTLE TIMES, May 
23, 2006, at A4; Eun Kyung Kim, Law Means Unwed Couple, 3 Kids May Be . . . Booted from 
Black Jack, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 22, 2006, at A1; Moore, supra note 5; Rigel Oliveri, 
When Zoning Rules Hurt Children, ST. LOUIS. POST-DISPATCH, May 25, 2006, at D11. 
 13. Press Release, City of Black Jack, Missouri, City of Black Jack Changes Definition of 
“Family,” (Aug. 16, 2006) [hereinafter Press Release, City of Black Jack], available at 
http://cityofblackjack.com/default.asp?sectionID=42&pageID=10121&showMenu=2. 
 14. Id.; see also Norm Parish, Black Jack Revises Housing Regulation, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 16, 2006, at A1. 
 15. As amended on August 15, 2006, Black Jack’s CODE OF ORDINANCES now defines 
“family” as: 
1. An individual living as a single nonprofit housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit; 
2. Two (2) or more persons related by blood, marriage, adoption or foster care 
relationship living together as a single nonprofit housekeeping unit in a dwelling 
unit; 
3. A group of not more than three (3) persons who need not be related by blood, 
marriage, adoption or foster care relationship, living together as a single 
nonprofit housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit; or 
4. Two (2) unrelated individuals having a child or children related by blood, 
adoption or foster care relationship to both such individuals, plus the biological, 
adopted or foster children of either such individual, living together as a single 
nonprofit housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit. 
CITY OF BLACK JACK, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES app. c, § 0.30(27) (2007). 
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ensure residents of the community are safe, provide adequate public services, 
etc.).  In order to meet these broader societal goals, local governments must 
make distinctions between what is permissible and impermissible.  As a result 
of making distinctions, local governments run the risk of being over- or under-
inclusive.  The difficulty of promulgating land use legislation that is neither 
over- or under-inclusive is especially acute in a local government’s 
determination of how many “families” may occupy a given residence, and 
more importantly for the purposes of this Comment, what constitutes a 
“family.”  No matter what definition of “family” is adopted, it is likely some 
living arrangements that do not impair the broader societal goals for which 
local governments are responsible will be excluded, while living arrangements 
that do in fact threaten these goals will be permitted.16 
Since 1970, the American family has undergone significant changes.  
“Traditional family”17 households have decreased as a proportion of all 
households.18  Further, “alternative family forms . . . are proliferating.”19  
Given these changes in the social landscape of America, potential issues with 
the definition of “family” are becoming especially prominent 20 and will likely 
occur with increasing frequency in the future. 
A non-traditional family adversely affected by a restrictive definition of 
“family” in a local zoning ordinance can challenge the ordinance in multiple 
ways, four of which will be discussed here.  First, a non-traditional family can 
rely on the political process, seeking relief by lobbying the legislature to 
 
 16. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 n.5 (1974); Town of Durham v. 
White Enters., 348 A.2d 706, 709 (N.H. 1975); DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND 
CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 251 (6th ed. 2005) [hereinafter 
MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL]. 
 17. The term “traditional family,” as used in this Comment, refers to family members related 
by blood, marriage, or adoption. 
 18. 1 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 3.06 n.1 (Eric Damian Kelly 
ed., 2006).  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, while “family households” made up 81% of all 
households in 1970, they only accounted for 68% in 2003.  JASON FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2003, at 
2 (2004).  Although the definition of “family household” provided by the U.S. Census Bureau 
does not comport exactly with the term “traditional family” as used in this Comment, these 
statistics are indicative of the decline of the traditional family and the proliferation of the non-
traditional family. 
 19. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 397 (2d ed. 2002). 
 20. Local legislatures in Manassas, Virginia; Knoxville, Tennessee; and Provo, Utah have 
recently struggled with how to define “family” in their local zoning ordinances.  Stephanie 
McCrummen, Manassas Defends New Rule on Who Can Live Together, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 
2005, at B4; Moore, supra note 5; see also Thomas F. Coleman, More Cities Grapple with 
Definition of ‘Family,’ UNMARRIED AMERICA, COLUMN ONE, Mar. 27, 2006, 
http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/column-one/3-27-06-cities-grapple-with-definition-of-
family.htm. 
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amend its definition or voting for different legislators.  Second, a non-
traditional family can challenge the ordinance on constitutional grounds, such 
as due process or equal protection.  Third, a non-traditional family can 
challenge the ordinance under the Fair Housing Act (FHA).  Lastly, a non-
traditional family can challenge a local government’s authority to define 
“family” in the first place and, further, challenge a specific definition of 
“family” as being outside that authority. 
This Comment focuses on the last of the options discussed above, namely 
judicial review of a local legislature’s authority to define “family” and the 
limitations on that authority.  This approach is appropriate for two reasons.  
First, analyzing restrictive definitions of “family” in this context offers distinct 
advantages over other possible challenges.  Second, the policy discussion that 
plays a central role in Part III of this Comment is equally applicable to the 
political process or, alternatively, to a constitutional or FHA challenge. 
Approaching restrictive definitions of “family” in the chosen context 
provides distinct advantages over other possible challenges.  First, although the 
political process played a central role in the relief obtained by Shelltrack and 
Loving in Black Jack,21 reliance on this method takes the judiciary completely 
out of the picture, thereby reducing any consistency in the expected result.  
Rather, the outcome will depend on the stubbornness of the local legislature.  
Reliance on the political process may have worked in Black Jack, but another 
local government might not be so quick to discard a definition of “family” that 
has been part of its zoning code for years.22 
Second, judicial review of a local government’s authority to define 
“family” allows for more constructive dialogue between the judiciary and 
multiple legislative bodies.23  This is a significant advantage over 
constitutional challenges based on due process or equal protection, where 
dialogue between the judiciary and state or local legislatures is severely 
 
 21. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
 22. In fact, Black Jack faced a similar challenge to its definition of “family” in 1999.  
Theresa Tighe, Unwed Parents of 3-Year-Old Triplets May Have to Move out of Black Jack, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 9, 1999, at N1.  However, in that instance, Black Jack refused to 
back down.  Black Jack Council Takes No Steps to Resolve Pair’s Occupancy Problem, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 23, 1999, at N6; see also Petition, supra note 1, at 10–11 (noting 
the 1999 instance as well as another documented instance occurring in 2005). 
 23. For example, if a court were to find that a local government was never granted the power 
to provide a definition of “family,” the state legislature would then have the opportunity to amend 
the state zoning enabling statute to grant this power to the local government.  Alternatively, if a 
court were to find that a local government has the power to define “family” but that the specific 
definition of “family” is arbitrary and unreasonable, the local legislature would have the 
opportunity to amend its definition to withstand judicial review.  See discussion infra Part II 
(detailing how states empower local governments to promulgate land use legislation). 
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hampered.24  By invalidating a zoning ordinance on constitutional grounds, 
state and local legislatures are unable to amend their zoning enabling acts to 
address the situation how they see fit, as representatives of the people.25  
Moreover, because courts may be more willing to invalidate a local zoning 
ordinance on non-constitutional grounds,26 a judicial review challenge may 
have a higher likelihood of success.  Federal and Missouri precedent also 
suggests that a constitutional challenge would likely be unsuccessful. 27 
Third, the context chosen for this Comment is superior to a challenge 
based on the Federal Fair Housing Act.28  The power to zone, since its 
inception in the early twentieth century, has been deemed part of the police 
power vested in the states.29  Moreover, family issues have traditionally been 
considered a state concern.30  Although a federal remedy may be appropriate to 
address some issues, a state remedy should be preferred when dealing with 
traditional state issues.  This sentiment is reinforced by the treatment of local 
zoning issues by the federal courts.31 
 
 24. Illinois is an excellent example of this premise.  The Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a 
definition of “family” in City of Des Plaines v. Trottner on the basis that the city’s definition of 
“family” went beyond the general authority delegated by the Illinois legislature rather than due 
process or equal protection.  216 N.E.2d 116, 118–20 (Ill. 1966).  The Illinois state legislature 
then responded by amending the zoning enabling act to empower local governments “to classify, 
to regulate and restrict the use of property on the basis of family relationship, which family 
relationship may be defined as one or more persons each related to the other by blood, marriage 
or adoption and maintaining a common household.”  65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13-1 (2004). 
 25. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368, 376 (N.J. 1979) (Mountain, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the majority erred in striking down the zoning ordinance on constitutional grounds 
as it forecloses any possibility for the legislature to respond). 
 26. Deciding a case on statutory grounds is “always preferable” to deciding a case on 
constitutional grounds.  Charter Twp. of Delta v. Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d 831, 837 n.4 (Mich. 
1984).  “Normally, where [a zoning issue] arises, a court will rest its decision upon a statutory 
rather than constitutional ground.  It has been suggested that this rule is absolute and unyielding.”  
Baker, 405 A.2d at 377 (Mountain, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 347 
(N.J. 1977) (Clifford, J., dissenting)).  “[T]he whole point is that the legislators and the people 
whom they represent should have the right to the final word.  This is what democracy is all 
about.”  Id. at 378. 
 27. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2, 9–10 (1974) (holding 
constitutionally valid a definition of “family” more restrictive than the definition at issue in Black 
Jack).  Precedent in Missouri indicates success on constitutional challenges would be unlikely.  
See City of Ladue v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745, 747, 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding definition 
of “family” more restrictive than the definition in Black Jack). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2000). 
 29. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926). 
 30. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615–16 (2000). 
 31. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL, supra note 16, at 250 (“[F]ederal courts 
are quite reluctant to be drawn into ‘garden variety’ zoning disputes, and have fashioned a variety 
of procedural and substantive rules to avoid doing so.”). 
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Approaching this issue in the context of judicial review of a local 
government’s authority to define “family” is also not exclusive of the other 
possible challenges discussed above.  The policy issues that are central to an 
analysis in this context are equally relevant to the political process or a 
challenge based on due process, equal protection, or the FHA.  In fact, 
different avenues for relief are often blurred by the courts so that, at times, it is 
difficult to determine which legal premise provided the basis for the decision.32 
This Comment will argue the following: (1) local governments in Missouri 
have the power to define “family”; (2) restrictive definitions33 of “family” will 
withstand judicial review in Missouri; and (3) relief for individuals adversely 
affected by restrictive definitions must come from local and state legislatures, 
not the judiciary.  In order to set the stage for this argument, Part I will briefly 
discuss the historical origins of single-family zoning, focusing specifically on 
the evolution of the definition of “family.”  Part II will determine whether it is 
within the power of local governments to define “family” in the zoning context 
by examining statutory authority and relevant case law.  Part III, broken down 
into four sections, will analyze the validity of a restrictive definition of 
“family.”  The first section will establish the proper standard of judicial review 
for a specific definition of “family.”  The second section will examine 
justifications for restrictive definitions of “family” based both on the practical 
goals of local governments as well as the preservation of the traditional family.  
The third section will review social science data and commentary to determine 
if additional support for restrictive definitions of “family” exists.  Lastly, the 
fourth section will argue that restrictive definitions of “family” will likely 
withstand judicial review and that relief for those adversely impacted should 
come from state and local legislatures. 
 
 32. Charter Twp. of Delta v. Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d 831, 839–40 (Mich. 1984) (after stating 
the test for judicial review of zoning legislation, the court decided to analyze the issue under due 
process standards in order to lessen the “extraordinary deference given to the line drawing in 
traditional zoning matters”); see also Dinan v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Town of Stratford, 595 
A.2d 864, 867 (Conn. 1991) (“[W]e conclude that the ultra vires question of whether [the 
ordinance] exceeds the grant of authority contained in [the enabling statute] depends upon our 
resolution of the issue of the reasonableness of the distinction made between a traditional family 
and any other group occupying a residence, which is similar to the constitutional question of 
equal protection of the law.”); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND-USE 
CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 62 (1981) (“[T]he constitutional law of landowner rights is 
exasperatingly untidy.  Different constitutional doctrines seem designed to serve identical 
purposes.  Judges often neglect to reveal on which clauses (or even to which constitution) they 
base their holdings.”). 
 33. The use of the term “restrictive definition(s)” in this Comment is meant to encompass all 
definitions of “family” that are limited, at least in part, to those related by blood, marriage, or 
adoption. 
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I.  HISTORY OF SINGLE-FAMILY ZONING AND THE DEFINITION OF “FAMILY” 
A. Historical Origins of Zoning and Use Districts 
The rise of modern zoning began in the early twentieth century.  Although 
examples of zoning can be found as early as 1904,34 the first comprehensive 
zoning plan was enacted in New York City in 1916.35  At the foundation of the 
New York plan was the division of the city into three separate districts: 
residential, business, and unrestricted.36  This system laid the groundwork for 
dividing areas of land into different use districts.37  The concept behind use 
districts is that land in a district will be allocated for a certain use while all 
other uses will be excluded.38  For example, a residential district will only 
allow residential uses, while all other uses, such as commercial or industrial, 
will be excluded.39  Subsequent to the enactment of the New York plan, 
comprehensive zoning spread rapidly across the country.  By the beginning of 
1926, “there were at least 425 zoned municipalities, comprising more than half 
the urban population of the country.”40  This rapid proliferation of zoning can 
be attributed in large part to the efforts of the federal government.  The Federal 
Department of Commerce proposed the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 
(SSZEA) in the mid-1920s.41  The SSZEA became the model on which most 
state zoning enabling acts were based.42  Although there was initial reluctance, 
the Missouri legislature adopted the Missouri Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA) in 
1925.43  The MZEA, as adopted in 1925, was based on the SSZEA.44 
Despite its widespread proliferation, the constitutionality of comprehensive 
zoning plans, like the SSZEA and MZEA, remained in doubt until 1926, when 
 
 34. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL, supra note 16, at 209 n.*. 
 35. Id. at 209. 
 36. Id. 
 37. “Control of land use through zoning is essential to avoid the hodgepodge and chaotic 
pattern with residential, commercial, industrial, and public and semi-public uses all 
intermingled—that is the inevitable result when there is no public control.”  HARLAND 
BARTHOLOMEW AND ASSOCIATES, A FINAL REPORT UPON LAND REGULATIONS: JEFFERSON 
COUNTY, MISSOURI 1 (1969). 
 38. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.02 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter 
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW]. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Herbert Hoover, Foreword to ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE:  A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT at III n.2 (rev’d ed. 1926) [hereinafter 
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT]. 
 41. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 38, § 4.15. 
 42. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL, supra note 16, at 212. 
 43. Michael T. White, History of Land Use Law, LAND USE PLANNING AND EMINENT 
DOMAIN IN MISSOURI 33–34 (2000). 
 44. Id. 
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the United States Supreme Court decided Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty.45  
In Euclid, the Court upheld the Village of Euclid’s comprehensive zoning 
system and found the power to zone within the inherent police power of the 
states to promote the “health, safety, morals and general welfare of the 
community.”46  With newfound endorsement from the United States Supreme 
Court, zoning was on a path it would travel with little impediment into the 
twenty-first century. 
B. Family as a Classification 
Although the New York plan of 1916 only included one broad 
“residential” use district, it was widespread “from the earliest days of zoning 
[to provide] for two or more residential use classifications, one of which was a 
‘single-family residential use’ classification.”47  In fact, the zoning ordinance 
in Euclid included a single-family residential use classification.48  Single-
family use districts were at the pinnacle of the use district system discussed 
above. 49  Local governments made it a priority to protect this district,50 
excluding all other uses.51  The protection of this district played a large part in 
the rationale of the Court in Euclid, where apartment buildings and other multi-
family dwellings were viewed as “mere parasite[s]” on the single-family 
residential neighborhood.52 
Given the prevalence of the “single-family” use district (or other use 
districts utilizing the term “family” such as “two-family” or “multi-family”), it 
became necessary to define “family.”53  Most early definitions of “family” did 
 
 45. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 46. Id. at 392 (“The segregation of industries, commercial pursuits, and dwellings to 
particular districts in a city, when exercised reasonably, may bear a rational relation to the health, 
morals, safety and general welfare of the community.”). 
 47. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL, supra note 16, at 286; see also EDWARD 
M. BASSETT, ZONING: THE LAWS, ADMINISTRATION, AND COURT DECISIONS DURING THE FIRST 
TWENTY YEARS 63–64 (1940). 
 48. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379–80; MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL, supra note 
16, at 286. 
 49. SANDRA H. JOHNSON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 879 
(2d ed. 1998); see also MORTON GITELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 1107 
(6th ed. 2004) (“Zoning, from the point of view of the average citizen, created a hierarchy of 
districts, culminating in the single-family residential district.  This ‘highest’ district was to be 
protected, not only from commercial and industrial incursions, but also from structures which 
might house more than one family, such as duplexes, townhouses, and apartments.”). 
 50. GITELMAN ET AL., supra note 49. 
 51. Id.; JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 49. 
 52. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394. 
 53. See 2 JAMES METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING 1359 (2d ed. 1955) (“In view of the 
fact that the yard stick in many zoning ordinances, is ‘Family per acre,’ it may be well briefly, at 
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not require any legal or biological relationship between the residents.54  Rather, 
“[t]he essential element was that the occupants be living together as a single 
housekeeping unit.”55  It was not until the 1960s that definitions of “family” 
started resembling what is thought of as the “traditional family,” namely those 
related by “blood, marriage, or adoption.”56  Some authority suggests that early 
use of the term “single-family” was meant to refer to “nothing more than the 
physical structure of the dwelling” and “was never intended to regulate the 
composition of a household.”57 
C. Current Definitions of “Family” 
A survey of the different definitions of “family” utilized in modern zoning 
ordinances reveals a broad spectrum of possibilities.  At the most restrictive 
end, there are definitions that include only an individual or group of 
individuals related by blood, marriage, or adoption.58  In this most restrictive 
example, only those related by blood, marriage, or adoption can reside in a 
single-family residence.  This definition would exclude an unmarried couple or 
a group of friends.  At the other end of the spectrum, there are definitions that 
 
least, to treat with the connotation of the word ‘family.’  The interpretation of the word ‘family,’ 
in a zoning ordinance does not usually agree with that in dictionaries.”). 
 54. 2 ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9:30 (4th ed. 1996); Frank S. Alexander, 
The Housing of America’s Families: Control, Exclusion, and Privilege, 54 EMORY L.J. 1231, 
1237–61 (2005); see, e.g., BASSET, supra note 47 at 188–89.  As an example of a “good” 
definition, “family” was defined as “any number of individuals living together as a single 
housekeeping unit and doing their cooking on the premises.”  Id. 
 55. 2 ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, supra note 54. 
 56. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL, supra note 16, at 288.  Some argue that 
definitions requiring biological or legal relationships between the residents were “motivated by 
the desire of local authorities to prevent establishment of ‘counter-culture’ or ‘hippy’ communes 
in single-family residential neighborhoods.”  Id.; see also 1 ROHAN, supra note 18 (“Zoning 
ordinances that seek to exclude on the basis of family definition were originally based upon fear 
of intrusions by newcomers who were perceived to have divergent life styles that conflict with the 
traditional American notion of ‘family.’”); THE TEXT OF A MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE § 18 
(American Society of Planning Officials, 3d ed. 1966) (“Family” means “[o]ne or more persons 
occupying a single dwelling unit, provided that unless all members are related by blood or 
marriage, no such family shall contain over five persons . . . .”). 
 57. 24 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 2 (1994). 
 58. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (“The zoning 
ordinance defined family as: ‘One or more persons related by blood, marriage or adoption, 
occupying a dwelling unit as an individual housekeeping organization.’”).  The U.S. Census 
Bureau also restrictively defines “family” as “a group of two people or more (one of whom is the 
householder) related by birth, marriage, or adoption and residing together.”  BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS)—DEFINITIONS AND 
EXPLANATIONS, http://www.census.gov/population/www/cps/cpsdef.html. 
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only require the residents live together as a “single housekeeping unit”59 or 
meet the definition of a “functional family.” 60  In this situation, there is no 
requirement of any legal or biological relationship.61  Between these two 
extremes, one can find countless possibilities.  Most definitions of “family” 
include those related by blood, marriage, or adoption as well as some fixed 
number of unrelated individuals residing as a single housekeeping unit.62  The 
definition of “family” challenged by Loving and Shelltrack in Black Jack 
would fall within this intermediate category.63  Having established the origins 
of single-family zoning and the definition of “family,” this Comment will now 
focus on the authority of local governments to define “family.” 
II.  LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN MISSOURI HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DEFINE 
“FAMILY” IN THE ZONING CONTEXT 
As discussed above, Euclid established that the power to zone is included 
in the police power of the states.64  However, it is the states that have this 
power, not local governments.  “In the United States, local governments . . . 
possess no inherent right of self government.”65  As such, local governments 
have “no inherent legislative power of [their] own” and must have legislative 
authority delegated to them by the state.66  For a local government to 
promulgate zoning legislation, there must have been prior delegation on the 
part of the state.67  There are two ways a state can confer the power to legislate 
to local governments.  First, the state may include a “home rule” provision in 
its constitution.68  A “home rule” provision “allows [a] municipalit[y] to act 
 
 59. See, e.g., Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d 888, 889 (N.J. 1990) (challenged 
statute defined “family” as “one or more persons occupying a dwelling unit as a single non-profit 
housekeeping unit, who are living together as a stable and permanent living unit, being a 
traditional family unit or the functional equivalency [sic] thereof”). 
 60. See, e.g., Stegeman v. City of Ann Arbor, 540 N.W.2d 724, 725 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) 
(challenged ordinance’s definition of “family” included “a functional family living as a single 
housekeeping unit which has received a special exception use permit”).  Factors to consider when 
determining if a living arrangement is a “functional family” or “single housekeeping unit” are 
permanency, stability, presence of shared activities and responsibilities, sharing of meals and 
recreational activities, and the presence of a relationship of nurture and support.  Alexander, 
supra note 54, at 1264; see also City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758 (N.Y. 
1974) (focusing on the intention of the residents to live together permanently). 
 61. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 446 (Cal. 1980) (in bank) (Manuel, J., 
dissenting). 
 62. See, e.g., id. at 442 (majority opinion). 
 63. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 64. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 65. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL, supra note 16, at 211. 
 66. Id. 
 67. County of Platte v. Chipman, 512 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). 
 68. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL, supra note 16, at 211. 
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with respect to local matters without a delegation of authority from the state 
legislature.”69  This is a broad grant of power to the local government and does 
not require the state to enumerate by statute the specific areas in which the 
local government can legislate.70  Alternatively, a state may enable a local 
government to legislate in a specific area through an enabling act.71  This is a 
limited grant of power and, therefore, the local legislators cannot act outside 
the specific grant of authority.  With respect to zoning, this is accomplished 
through a zoning enabling act.  The sections below will analyze and interpret 
this type of enabling act in Missouri.  Part II.A will review the text and history 
of the MZEA to determine if it confers the power to define “family.”  Part II.B 
will then review case law from Missouri and other states to see if additional 
guidance is available for interpreting the MZEA. 
A. Is the Power to Define “Family” Conferred by the Missouri Zoning 
Enabling Act? 
In Missouri, the power to promulgate zoning legislation is provided 
through the MZEA.72  The MZEA is the sole source of zoning power vested in 
Missouri local governments73 and local governments may not exceed the 
power provided.74  If a local government attempts to exceed the powers 
specifically delegated (i.e., acts ultra vires), the zoning legislation will be 
invalid.75  Therefore, prior to an analysis of whether a local government’s 
specific definition of “family” will withstand judicial review, it must be 
established that local governments are empowered to promulgate a definition 
of “family” in the first place. 
The MZEA has been amended several times since its adoption in 1925.  
However, the original language mirrored that of the SSZEA.76  Absent from 
either the original MZEA or the SSZEA is any express grant of authority to 
define “family” in the zoning context.  In fact, the word “family” is not used in 
the original MZEA or the text of the SSZEA.  Therefore, if the drafters of the 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 211–12. 
 71. Id. at 212. 
 72. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 89.010–89.140 (2000).  The power of Missouri counties to regulate 
land use is promulgated in sections 64.001 through 64.975.  MO. REV. STAT. §§ 64.001–64.975 
(2000). 
 73. Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833, 838 (Mo. 1963); City of Louisiana 
v. Branham, 969 S.W.2d 332, 336 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
 74. McCarty v. City of Kansas City, 671 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Despotis v. 
City of Sunset Hills, 619 S.W.2d 814, 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
 75. City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 216 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ill. 1966) (invalidating a zoning 
ordinance on the grounds that it exceeds the authority granted by the state legislature); Allen v. 
Coffell, 488 S.W.2d 671, 678–79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). 
 76. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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original MZEA intended local governments to have the power to define 
“family,” it must be implicit in the other powers conferred. 
In order to determine if the power to define “family” is implicit in the other 
powers conferred, consideration must be given both to the express powers 
conferred by the MZEA as well as the enumerated purposes for which those 
powers are given.  The express powers conferred to local governments can be 
found in section 89.020 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.77  “For the purpose 
of promoting health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the community,” 
section 89.020 empowers “all cities, towns and villages” of Missouri 
to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories, and size of buildings and 
other structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, 
courts, and other open spaces, the density of population, the preservation of 
features of historical significance, and the location and use of buildings, 
structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes.78 
Looking at the express language of section 89.020, there are two portions that 
could arguably support the contention that local governments have the power 
to define “family.”  First, local governments have the power to “regulate and 
restrict . . . the density of population.”79  Second, local governments have the 
power to “regulate and restrict . . . the use of buildings [and] structures . . . for 
residence.”80 
For the power to “regulate and restrict the density of population” to 
authorize local governments to define “family,” one would have to argue that 
grouping individuals into “families” (no matter how restrictively the term is 
defined) is a more effective and efficient way to regulate the density of 
population than simply regulating the number of individuals that can occupy a 
residence.  In other words, it seems apparent that the most “direct” way to 
regulate the density of population would be to restrict the number of 
individuals that can reside in a fixed area (e.g. 5 individuals per residence, 50 
individuals per square block, or 500 individuals per square mile).81  However, 
if a local government can demonstrate that grouping individuals into “families” 
allows more people to reside in a fixed area without increasing the negative 
externalities associated with a higher population density, it would be apparent 
that the local government is adopting a more effective way to “regulate and 
 
 77. MO. REV. STAT. § 89.020 (2000).  Section 89.030 also includes powers conferred to 
local governments, namely the power to divide a municipality into districts with varying uses.  
MO. REV. STAT. § 89.030. 
 78. Id. § 89.020. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. “Area or facility-related ordinances not only bear a much greater relation to the problem 
of overcrowding than do legal or biologically based classifications, they also do not impact the 
composition of the household.  They thus constitute a more reasoned manner of protecting the 
public health.”  State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368, 373 (N.J. 1979). 
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restrict . . . the density of population.”  Therefore, a local government would 
have the implicit power to define “family.” 
The second express power that could arguably include the power to define 
“family” is the power to “regulate and restrict . . . the use of buildings [and] 
structure . . . for . . . residence.”82  Construing this power narrowly, it appears 
to only grant a local government the power to limit buildings or structures to 
residential use, as opposed to commercial or industrial use.  However, a broad 
construction of this power would allow the residential use to be further broken 
down into subcategories, such as single-family, two-family, and multi-family.  
If this broad construction is adopted, this portion of the statute could arguably 
authorize local governments to define “family.” 
Looking past the express powers conferred by section 89.020, further 
insight into the scope of these powers can be ascertained by the purposes 
outlined in the MZEA.  Two portions of the MZEA, sections 89.020 and 
89.040, discuss the purposes for which local governments should use their 
zoning powers.  First, section 89.020 states that the powers conferred should be 
used for “the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general 
welfare.”83  These purposes mirror the purposes for which the general police 
power is to be used by the states.84  According to the notes of the SSZEA, this 
“statement of purpose . . . define[s] and limit[s] the powers created by the 
legislature to the municipality under the police power.”85 
The promotion of “health, safety, morals, and the general welfare” sheds 
little light on whether a local government is acting within its authority when it 
provides a definition for “family.”86  These are broad categories and, as such, 
most government action can easily fit within their bounds.  One could argue 
the division of a municipality into use districts based on the number of families 
that can occupy a residence helps serve these broad purposes.  First, health and 
safety are furthered by limitations on the number of people that can occupy a 
 
 82. MO. REV. STAT. § 89.020 (emphasis added).  The power to regulate the use of buildings 
and structures is echoed in section 89.030.  Id. § 89.030. 
 83. Id. § 89.020. 
 84. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389–90 (1926). 
 85. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 40, at 6 n.21. 
 86. BASSETT, supra note 47. 
When Greater New York was zoned there was no segregation of residence districts 
according to the number of families in a dwelling.  It was feared that courts would not 
uphold districting on that basis because of the difficulty of showing that the number of 
families, apart from space requirements per family, was substantially related to the health 
and safety of the community . . . . But the demand throughout the country for the 
segregation of detached, one-family houses from multi-family houses was so great, and 
the proof so clear that there were health and safety considerations that justified such a 
separation that courts generally recognized as valid the gradations of residence districts 
according to the number of families per unit building. 
Id. 
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residence.  Although these goals are served somewhat indirectly through 
limiting the number of families rather than the number of individuals, this 
would likely fall within these broad categories.  For example, in defense of its 
ordinance, Black Jack stated that “[m]aintaining the quality of the City’s 
housing stock and preventing overcrowding and misuse of residences are 
important functions of the Housing Code.”87  Black Jack also provided 
examples of misfortunes that might result if these purposes are not met, such as 
four deaths in Michigan City, Indiana due to the overcrowding of a house.88  
Second, the general welfare is also furthered by limiting the number of families 
that can occupy a residence.  The use of “families” as a classification helps 
maintain the residential aspects of neighborhoods and promotes family values, 
both of which can be considered part of the “general welfare.”  The promotion 
of family values (i.e., the preservation of the traditional family) will be 
discussed in detail in Part III, infra.  Given the potential broad meaning of 
“promoting health, safety, morals or the general welfare,” defining “family” is 
most likely within the powers conferred by the MZEA. 
Section 89.040 reinforces the purpose detailed in section 89.020, but also 
includes other more specific purposes: 
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and 
designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic 
and other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to provide 
adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue 
concentration of population; to preserve features of historical significance; to 
facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, 
parks, and other public requirements.89 
These more specific purposes make it even clearer that using “family” as the 
unit of classification helps further the goals of the MZEA.  As stated above, the 
MZEA, including the purposes listed in section 89.040, was based on the 
SSZEA.  As such, the notes to the SSZEA, which provide further insight into 
the actual text, were presumably read and considered by the Missouri 
legislators who promulgated the MZEA.  Therefore, the notes to the SSZEA 
are valuable in interpreting section 89.040.  The notes to the SSZEA indicate 
that the purposes in section 89.040 “contain . . . practically a direction from the 
legislative body as to the purposes in view in establishing a zoning ordinance 
and the manner in which the work of preparing such an ordinance shall be 
done.”90 
Logically speaking, a group of individuals sharing living space most likely 
use less resources and produce less negative externalities than individuals with 
 
 87. Press Release, City of Black Jack, supra note 13. 
 88. Id. 
 89. MO. REV. STAT. § 89.040 (2000). 
 90. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 40, at 6 n.21. 
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separate living quarters.  More often than not, individuals sharing living space 
also share public resources such as water and electricity.  Further, automobiles 
or other transportation might be shared.  If this is the case, the purposes in 
section 89.040 are clearly furthered as less public resources will be used and 
the streets will be less congested. 
Other notes included in the SSZEA also clarify the intention of the original 
drafters of the MZEA.  According to note 12: 
It may be more desirable to limit the number of families to the acre or the 
number of families to a given house, etc.  The expression “number of people to 
the acre” is therefore more limited in its meaning and describes only one way 
of reducing congestion of population, while the phrase “limiting density of 
population” is all- embracing.  It is believed that, with proper restrictions, this 
provision will make possible the creation of one-family residence districts.91 
From a reading of this note, it is clear the drafters of the SSZEA intended 
residential districts to be further divided based on the number of families that 
could occupy a residence.  If the original drafters of the MZEA read and 
embraced the notes to the SSZEA, it appears they intended for residential 
districts to be divided into smaller districts based on the number of families.  
As such, the power to define “family” is implicit. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that although the original 
version of the MZEA did not include an express power to subdivide residential 
districts into smaller districts based on the number of families and, therefore, 
define “family,” local governments are arguably acting within the language of 
the statute when they take this approach.  The 1985 and 1989 amendments to 
section 89.020 somewhat clarify this issue.  In these amendments, the Missouri 
legislature added subsections (2) through (6) to section 89.020.92  Although the 
purpose of these new subsections was wholly separate from the issues 
examined in this Comment,93 they shed light on whether local governments 
have the power to define “family.”  For the first time in the history of the 
MZEA, the term “family” was used in these statutory subsections.94  Although 
the word “family” was only used as part of the terms “single family residence” 
and “single family dwelling,” its use bolsters an argument that the powers 
conferred by the MZEA include the implicit authority to define “family.”  
 
 91. Id. at 5 n.12. 
 92. 1985 Mo. Legis. Serv. 159–60 (West); 1989 Mo. Legis. Serv. 932–40 (West). 
 93. Subsections (2) through (6) were added to protect group homes and foster homes as well 
as clarify the zoning powers of local governments situated on a lake.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 
89.020(2)–(6). 
 94. The word “family” is used in subsections (2), (5), and (6) as a part of the terms “single 
family residence” or “single family dwelling.”  Id.  It is also used in subsection (6) to refer to the 
division of family services, id., however, this use does not further the argument presented in this 
Comment. 
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Stated plainly, if the determination is made that local governments have the 
power to use “family” as a unit of classification, which based on the 
amendments they clearly do, the power to define “family” is implicit.  This 
concept was supported by the United States Supreme Court in City of Edmunds 
v. Oxford House, Inc. when the Court said, “[t]o limit land use to single-family 
residences, a municipality must define the term ‘family’; thus family 
composition rules are an essential component of single-family residential use 
restrictions.”95 
In conclusion, the text of the MZEA appears to allow a local government 
to define “family.”  The next section will review case law from Missouri and 
other states to see if additional guidance is available for interpreting the 
MZEA. 
B. Case Law From Missouri and Other States 
A review of Missouri case law reveals a complete lack of analysis by 
Missouri courts regarding whether local governments have the power to define 
“family.”  However, Missouri courts have discussed the powers conferred in 
section 89.020: 
[A] [c]ity’s legislative body has the duty and right to determine for itself what 
plan, classification and regulations are necessary to promote the health, safety, 
general welfare, morality or other named purpose of the enabling statute; to 
determine the use classification to be given to any particular area, and to 
provide for suitable and lawful changes in such classifications and regulations 
thereafter.96 
Therefore, substantial latitude and deference is given to local legislatures with 
respect to the promulgation of land use legislation.  Other state courts have 
echoed this thought: “The statutory authority of the city to provide for a single-
family use district as a ‘specified . . . residential’ use classification seems clear 
enough . . . .”97 
Although the power to define “family” is not addressed by Missouri courts, 
the Michigan Supreme Court analyzed a local government’s authority to define 
“family” in Charter Township of Delta v. Dinolfo.98  In Dinolfo, the court 
determined that the local government was not acting outside its authority in 
defining “family.”99  Although the Michigan enabling statute did not expressly 
confer the power to define “family,” the court found this power to be 
 
 95. 514 U.S. 725, 733 (1995). 
 96. Deacon v. City of Ladue, 294 S.W.2d 616, 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956). 
 97. City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 216 N.E.2d 116, 118 (Ill. 1966). 
 98. 351 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Mich. 1984).  Michigan appears to be the only state that has 
approached this issue directly.  See 24 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 9 (1994). 
 99. Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d at 835–36. 
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implicit.100  In doing so, the court reasoned that because the enabling statute 
used the term “families,” the legislature implicitly authorized the local 
legislatures to define what constitutes a “family.”101  In contrast, the original 
MZEA did not use the word “family.”102  Therefore, it is not totally clear if the 
original drafters of the MZEA intended for local governments to define 
“family.”  However, following the reasoning of the Michigan Supreme Court, 
the inclusion of the word “family” in the 1985 and 1989 amendments to 
section 89.020 grants local legislatures the power to define “family.”103  This 
argument is further bolstered by the use of the word “family” in the notes of 
the SSZEA, which were presumably considered by the promulgators of the 
original MZEA.104 
From a practical standpoint, it is highly unlikely a challenge to a local 
government’s power to define “family” would be successful today.  The 
concept of “family” as a basis for classification in residential districts is now 
deeply rooted in the history and tradition of zoning.  Further, many local 
zoning ordinances in Missouri define the term “family,” and therefore, a 
successful challenge to the power to define “family” would invalidate 
numerous local ordinances.  Moreover, despite substantial litigation over 
acceptable definitions of “family,” no Missouri court has questioned the power 
of local governments to define “family.”  It would be unlikely for a court to 
now question this power. 
In light of the above analysis, it is clear that local governments in Missouri 
have the power to provide a definition of “family” based on the text and 
history of the MZEA as well as case law from Missouri and other states.  This 
Comment will next analyze the limitations on this power. 
III.  GIVEN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN MISSOURI HAVE THE POWER TO DEFINE 
“FAMILY,” WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS ON THIS POWER? 
Having established that local governments in Missouri do have the power 
to define “family,” it is now necessary to identify what definitions of “family” 
are permissible.  The first step in this analysis, addressed in Part III.A below, is 
to determine the appropriate standard of judicial review of a definition of 
“family” in local zoning legislation.  The next step is to determine if a 
definition of “family” that distinguishes between related and unrelated 
individuals (such as the definition in Black Jack) will survive judicial review 
under the appropriate standard.  In order to do this, Part III.B will review 
justifications for restrictive definitions based both on the practical concerns of 
 
 100. Id. at 836. 
 101. Id. at 835–37. 
 102. See supra Part II.A. 
 103. See Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d at 835–36. 
 104. See supra Part II.A. 
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local governments as well as justifications based on the preservation of the 
traditional family.  Part III.C will then examine social data and commentary 
supporting the preservation of the traditional family to demonstrate that 
additional evidence is available to local governments.  Lastly, Part III.D will 
present the author’s analysis of the appropriate remedy for those adversely 
impacted by restrictive definitions. 
A. What Is the Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review for Local Zoning 
Legislation? 
In determining the appropriate standard of judicial review for local zoning 
legislation, the threshold determination is whether the local government action 
is legislative or administrative (i.e., quasi-judicial).  Missouri case law clearly 
indicates that “[z]oning, rezoning, and refusals to rezone are legislative 
acts.”105  In contrast, decisions by a local government that apply to a single 
individual with a particular set of facts (such as the approval or denial of an 
occupancy permit) are generally considered to be administrative acts.106  
Therefore, would a local government’s definition of “family” as applied to 
individuals such as Loving and Shelltrack be considered legislative or 
administrative?  Because the definition of “family” applies evenly to all single-
family use districts, and the promulgation of a definition of “family” was not 
intended to be a decision with respect to any individual case with a particular 
set of facts, it would likely be considered a legislative act in Missouri courts.107 
Legislative acts are an exercise of the state’s police power, and therefore, 
the scope of judicial review of zoning legislation is limited.108  Moreover, 
those challenging a zoning ordinance must overcome a presumption of 
validity.109  Given this limited scope and presumption of validity, there is 
 
 105. Erigan Co. v. Grantwood Vill., 632 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (citing 
Vatterott v. City of Florissant, 462 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Mo. 1971)). 
 106. McDonald v. City of Brentwood, 66 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (“Missouri case 
law holds that an issuance of an occupancy permit is an administrative act.”). 
 107. This does not mean, however, that Loving and Shelltrack could not challenge the denial 
of their occupancy permit application as a separate avenue of judicial relief.  If they were to make 
this challenge, the court would likely apply a less deferential standard of review.  Although the 
standard of review of administrative decisions is typically less deferential than that for legislative 
decisions, the standards are remarkably similar in the zoning context.   See State ex rel. Ellis v. 
Liddle, 520 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (“[L]imitations upon the scope of judicial 
review of matters related to zoning stem from the fact that the exercise of the right to control the 
use of property is basically and historically a legislative exercise of police power by the 
sovereign.”).  Therefore, even when zoning action is administrative, much of the deference 
accorded to legislative action carries over.  For this reason, this Comment will only focus on 
judicial review of legislative decisions. 
 108. City of Ladue v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he reviewing 
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning authority.”). 
 109. Despotis v. City of Sunset Hills, 619 S.W.2d 814, 820 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
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broad discretion vested in the legislature, and courts can only interfere if the 
legislature has acted arbitrarily and unreasonably.110  In determining if the 
action of the legislature is arbitrary and unreasonable, the court will assess 
whether the action is “fairly debatable.”111  An action is “fairly debatable” if 
reasonable minds can differ as to its validity.112  If a local government is able 
to meet this deferential standard, or conversely, if a challenger is unable to 
overcome this standard, the legislative action will be upheld. 
While not binding precedent in Missouri, the rationale behind the 
deference exhibited in the zoning context was best set forth by Justice Smith, 
writing for the Michigan Supreme Court: 
[T]his Court does not sit as a super-zoning commission.  Our laws have 
wisely committed to the people of a community themselves the 
determination of their municipal destiny, the degree to which the 
industrial may have precedence over the residential, and the areas 
carved out of each to be devoted to commercial pursuits. With the 
wisdom or lack of wisdom of the determination we are not concerned. 
The people of the community, through their appropriate legislative 
body, and not the courts, govern its growth and its life. Let us state the 
proposition as clearly as may be: It is not our function to approve the 
ordinance before us as to wisdom or desirability. For alleged abuses 
involving such factors the remedy is the ballot box, not the courts. We 
do not substitute our judgment for that of the legislative body charged 
with the duty and responsibility in the premises.113 
Therefore, the hurdle for local governments to overcome with respect to their 
zoning legislation is low.  If the local government can put forth an argument 
that its legislation furthers the purposes detailed in the MZEA, discussed at 
length in Part II, courts will be unlikely to interfere. 
In order to determine if local zoning legislation is “arbitrary and 
unreasonable,” the analysis must again focus on the purposes outlined in the 
MZEA.  If a specific definition of “family” furthers the broad purposes of the 
police power, namely “health, safety, morals or general welfare,” it is not 
arbitrary and unreasonable.114  With respect to the “general welfare,” some 
guidance has been provided by Missouri courts: 
 
 110. Wrigley Prop., Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Mo. 1963); Erigan Co., 632 
S.W.2d at 496; Deacon v. City of Ladue, 294 S.W.2d 616, 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956). 
 111. Despotis, 619 S.W.2d at 820. 
 112. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 38, § 1.12. 
 113. Robinson v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 86 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Mich. 1957); see also 
Zavala v. City and County of Denver, 759 P.2d 664, 669 (Colo. 1988) (“Implicit in this 
constitutional delegation of authority is the recognition that the City possesses broad legislative 
discretion to determine how best to achieve declared municipal objectives.”). 
 114. MO. REV. STAT. § 89.020 (2000). 
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Zoning is lawful only when it bears a substantial relation to the public 
welfare. If the public welfare is not served by the zoning or if the 
public interest served by the zoning is greatly outweighed by the 
detriment to private interests, the zoning is considered to be arbitrary 
and unreasonable . . . .115 
Thus, there is some indication that “the determination whether a zoning 
ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable requires the weighing of the detriment 
to private interests against the benefit to the general public.”116  The next 
section will analyze whether restrictive definitions of “family” in local zoning 
ordinances are arbitrary and unreasonable under the standard established 
above. 
B. A Definition of “Family” That Distinguishes Between Related and 
Unrelated Individuals Is Not Arbitrary and Unreasonable 
In order to establish whether a definition of “family” that distinguishes 
between related individuals and unrelated individuals is arbitrary and 
unreasonable, it is necessary to examine the different justifications put forth by 
various local governments in support of their legislation.  These justifications 
can be grouped into two categories.  First, there are the practical justifications.  
These justifications are premised on the idea that distinguishing between 
related and unrelated individuals helps manage practical government concerns 
such as density of population, traffic congestion, health, safety, etc.  Second, 
there are the justifications premised in moral virtues such as the sanctity of the 
family and the promotion of traditional family values.  Although these two 
categories are often intertwined, Part III.B.1 will analyze the practical 
justifications, while Part III.B.2 will analyze the justifications based on the 
preservation of the traditional family. 
1. Practical Justifications for Distinguishing Between Related and 
Unrelated Individuals Are Arguably Arbitrary and Unreasonable 
The concept that groups of cohabitating individuals are a lesser burden on 
society than the same number of individuals living separately was discussed at 
length in Part II.A.  To briefly reiterate, it is logical that groups of cohabitating 
individuals produce less negative externalities (in the form of traffic, use of 
public services and resources, etc.) than the same number of individuals living 
separately.  By sharing resources, less are used overall.  However, when 
dealing with restrictive definitions of “family,” this premise must be stretched 
to say that a group of related cohabitating individuals produce less negative 
externalities than a group of unrelated cohabitating individuals. 
 
 115. Loomstein v. St. Louis County, 609 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
 116. Id. 
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A local government would most likely be successful in making this 
argument with respect to certain types of living arrangements of unrelated 
cohabitating individuals, such as fraternity houses or boarding houses.117  In 
the words of Justice Gerrard of the Nebraska Supreme Court, these types of 
groups share a residence 
not to function as a family, but for convenience and economics over a limited 
period of time.  A houseful of unrelated adults, unlike a typical family, lead 
lives separate from one another.  This means separate automobiles, separate 
jobs, separate comings and goings, and separate friends, all with their separate 
automobiles.  Limiting this sort of household in what the city intends to be a 
residential neighborhood bears a real and substantial connection to the city’s 
objectives of quiet neighborhoods, few motor vehicles, and low transiency. 118 
The practical justifications for distinguishing between related and unrelated 
individuals were also found persuasive in City of Brookings v. Winker.119  In 
Winker, the court upheld the definition of “family” based on the local 
government’s justification that the definition promulgated helped control 
population density.120  The court reasoned that because “Brookings is a college 
town and has unavoidable problems with population density. . . . It is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious to draw this line at the number of unrelated persons 
who may reside in the same household to maintain control over population 
density problems.”121 
To be sure, a local government seeking to avoid fraternity and boarding 
houses would be able to make a “fairly debatable” argument that the ordinance 
is not arbitrary and unreasonable.  However, the rationality of this argument 
expressed by Justice Gerrard and reiterated in Winker becomes less viable 
when it is applied to living arrangements that more closely resemble a 
traditional family.  For example, it is doubtful if Loving and Shelltrack, 
discussed in the Introduction, do any more to threaten the “objectives of quiet 
neighborhoods, few motor vehicles and low transiency” than they would if 
they were married.  Can it possibly be argued that because they are not married 
 
 117. See, e.g., Town of Durham v. White Enters., 348 A.2d 706, 708 (N.H. 1975) 
(acknowledging the prevention of the “overcrowding of land” and “insuring against undue 
concentration of population” as legitimate purposes of zoning regulations); Borough of Glassboro 
v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d 888, 889 (N.J. 1990) (stated purpose of restrictive definition of “family” in 
zoning ordinance was to “prevent groups of unrelated college students from living together in the 
Borough’s residential districts,” “preservation of ‘family style living,’” and the “preservation of 
the character of residential neighborhoods”). 
 118. State v. Champoux, 566 N.W.2d 763, 770 (Neb. 1997) (Gerrard, J., concurring). 
 119. 554 N.W.2d 827 (S.D. 1996). 
 120. Id. at 829. 
 121. Id. at 831. 
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they make more noise and have more cars?  An argument along these lines 
does not even appear to meet a “fairly debatable” standard.122 
The goal of local governments to have “low transiency,” cited by Justice 
Gerrard above, carries more weight in both the example of fraternity and 
boarding houses as well as groups that more closely resemble a traditional 
family.  Low transiency is cited often by courts, but is often couched in terms 
such as “permanence”123 or “stability.”124  One could possibly argue that 
without the legal obligation of marriage, there is a lower exit cost if Loving or 
Shelltrack want to leave the “family.”  Stated differently, if Loving or 
Shelltrack do not need to worry about the consequences of a divorce, would it 
make the decision to leave the “family” that much easier and, therefore, 
adversely impact the goal of “low transiency”?125  It makes sense that as 
barriers to exit are removed, exit becomes easier and more probable.  This 
logic is supported by legal commentary, which indicates that the lack of a legal 
or biological relationship does reduce the exit costs for individuals leaving a 
living arrangement and, as such, does make it easier for one to leave.126 
However, if we apply this argument to Loving and Shelltrack, it is less 
persuasive.  Loving and Shelltrack have been together for thirteen years and 
have two children of their own.  Therefore, the exit costs if one of them were 
to leave do not appear to be significantly different than if they were married.  
The “low transiency” argument put forth by cities also does not fully account 
for the high divorce rate in the United States, 127 which suggests that traditional 
 
 122. See J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 761, 774–75 
(1982) (reviewing courts’ reliance on practical concerns such as traffic, noise, protection of 
property values, and aesthetics when justifying restrictive definitions of “family”). 
 123. See, e.g., Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d 888, 889 (N.J. 1990); State v. 
Baker, 405 A.2d 368, 371, 375 (N.J. 1979); McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 482 N.Y.S.2d 773, 
778, 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
 124. See, e.g., City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1980) (in bank) 
(“The [restrictive definition] might reflect an assumption that an unrelated group will be . . . less 
stable . . . .”). 
 125. This argument can also be extended to non-traditional families where one of the adults is 
not the biological parent of one of the children.  The lack of a biological relationship might make 
it easier for an adult to exit a living arrangement. 
 126. David D. Haddock & Daniel D. Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification, 74 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 15, 19 (1996) (“There does exist a probabilistic difference between family, as that term is 
ordinarily understood, and non-family, and it has to do with the relative probabilities of exit, 
emotional as well as physical, from the household.”); see also Adamson, 610 P.2d at 447 
(Manuel, J., dissenting).  Alternative living arrangements are labeled as “voluntary, with 
fluctuating memberships who have no legal obligations of support or cohabitation.”  Id.  
Additionally, “they are in no way subject to the State’s vast body of domestic relations law.”  Id. 
 127. Although sources vary, the national divorce rate is between 40% and 50%.  Maureen 
Fan, Stigma of Divorce Lessens in China, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 2007, at A8 
(placing U.S. divorce rate at 50%); Art Golab, Divorce Rate an Exact Science—Almost, CHICAGO 
SUN-TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, at A19 (divorce rate between 40% and 50%); Ctr. for Marriage and 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] DEFINITION OF “FAMILY” IN MISSOURI LOCAL ZONING ORDINANCES 653 
families often fall apart as well.  Further, divorce laws have been evolving for 
quite some time to make it easier to obtain a divorce (e.g., no-fault divorce). 128  
As these laws evolve, the exits costs for traditional families fall more in line 
with those for non-traditional families. 
Therefore, practical justifications for a definition of “family” that 
distinguishes between related and unrelated individuals appear tenuous at best.  
Although restrictive definitions of “family” could arguably reduce transiency, 
other practical justifications, such as traffic and use of public resources, are 
persuasive only when applied to limited non-traditional living arrangements, 
such as fraternity and boarding houses.  Is this sufficient to meet the “fairly 
debatable” test in determining if the definition is arbitrary and unreasonable in 
light of the fact that restrictive definitions will likely be, as established above, 
over-inclusive? 
Although it is to be expected that any zoning legislation will be somewhat 
arbitrary (i.e., it will be over- and/or under-inclusive),129 the level of 
arbitrariness is contingent on how far the zoning legislation strays from its 
stated purpose.  Stated differently, at some point the means used are so remote 
when compared with the legitimate ends, that it is no longer “fairly debatable” 
and, therefore, arbitrary and unreasonable.  This idea has been expressed by 
multiple courts, finding that a distinction between related and unrelated 
individuals is simply too attenuated from the stated practical justifications to 
not be considered arbitrary and unreasonable.130  In the words of the California 
 
Families, Inst. for Am. Values, Fact Sheet No. 1: What is America’s Most Serious Social 
Problem?, Feb. 2006, at 1, available at http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/factsheet1.pdf 
(divorce rate of 45%). 
 128. Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws and At-Fault People, 18 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 325, 325 (1998); Nancy Moore Clatworthy, The Non-Traditional Family and the 
Child, 12 CAP. U. L. REV. 345, 347 (1983). 
 129. As the Supreme Court noted in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: 
When a legal distinction is determined, as no one doubts that it may be, between night and 
day, childhood and maturity, or any other extremes, a point has to be fixed or a line has to 
be drawn, or gradually picked out by successive decisions, to mark where the change 
takes place.  Looked at by itself without regard to the necessity behind it the line or point 
seems arbitrary.  It might as well or nearly as well be a little more to one side or the other.  
But when it is seen that a line or point there must be, and that there is no mathematical or 
logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless 
we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark. 
416 U.S. 1, 8 n.5 (1974) (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).  “The essence of zoning is selection and if it is not invidious or 
discriminatory against those not selected it is proper.”  Town of Durham v. White Enters., 348 
A.2d 706, 709 (N.H. 1975); see also MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL, supra note 
16, at 251. 
 130. See, e.g., Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 281 A.2d 513, 518 (N.J. 1971) 
(holding the challenged ordinance would “preclude so many harmless dwelling uses . . . that they 
must be held to be so sweepingly excessive, and therefore legally unreasonable, that they must 
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Supreme Court, “density control is achieved quite indirectly, if at all, by 
regulating only the size of unrelated households.”131  The Illinois Supreme 
Court used similar logic in striking down a restrictive definition of “family”: 
 . . . [A] group of persons bound together only by their common desire to 
operate a single housekeeping unit, might be thought to have a transient quality 
that would affect adversely the stability of the neighborhood . . . .  And it might 
be considered that a group of unrelated persons would be more likely to 
generate traffic and parking problems than would an equal number of related 
persons.   
 But none of these observations reflects a universal truth.132 
Further, there are other options available for cities to achieve the same goals 
without being as over- and/or under-inclusive.  For example, local 
governments can employ all or some combination of the following actions in 
order to meet their practical goals: (1) vigorous use of police power and 
application of criminal statutes; (2) single-family zoning ordinances which 
specifically exclude boarding houses, fraternity houses, etc.; (3) definitions of 
“family” which include bona fide single housekeeping units or functional 
families; and (4) regulations regarding the maximum number of individuals per 
square foot or per available sleeping and bathroom facilities.133 
 
fall in their entirety”); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758 (N.Y. 1974) 
(“Zoning is intended to control types of housing and living and not the genetic or intimate internal 
family relations of human beings.”).  In Charter Twp. of Delta v. Dinolfo, the Michigan Supreme 
Court stated: 
Unrelated persons are artificially limited to as few as two, while related families may 
expand without limit.  Under the instant ordinance, twenty male cousins could live 
together, motorcycles, noise, and all, while three unrelated clerics could not.  A greater 
example of over- and under-inclusiveness we cannot imagine.  The ordinance 
indiscriminately regulates where no regulation is needed and fails to regulate where 
regulation is most needed. 
351 N.W.2d 831, 841–42 (Mich. 1984).  The court, noting that the defendants in Dinolfo were 
members of a religious community, further noted that “[t]he plight of the defendants in this 
case—who certainly defy the plaintiff’s stereotype of the unrelated family—represents the best 
evidence of the perniciousness of allowing unexamined assumptions to become the basis of 
regulatory classification.”  Id. at 843. 
 131. Adamson, 610 P.2d at 441 (majority opinion). 
 132. City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 216 N.E.2d 116, 119 (Ill. 1966). 
 133. State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368, 373 (N.J. 1979) (citing area- or facility-related ordinances, 
limitation on the number of cars, and use of the general police power as more appropriate ways to 
deal with overcrowding, traffic, and obnoxious personal behavior, respectively).  This argument 
was persuasive in Santa Barbara v. Adamson where the court, after establishing how each of the 
city’s stated goals could be met by less restrictive means such as use restrictions, police 
enforcement, and floor space or facility requirements, stated “zoning ordinances are much less 
suspect when they focus on the use than when they command inquiry into who are the users.”  
610 P.2d at 441–42 (emphasis omitted). 
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However, if a restrictive definition of “family” is going to be struck down 
on the basis that the practical justifications are too attenuated from the means 
utilized, there would need to be some consideration of the administrative 
impact on local governments.  In other words, local governments can argue 
that by including a restrictive definition of “family” in their zoning ordinances, 
they are not trying to pass judgment on the composition of households, but 
rather are simply trying to provide a definition that is administratively feasible.  
Individuals related by blood, marriage, or adoption have government 
documentation (in the form of marriage certificates, birth certificates, and 
adoption certificates) and can easily prove these relationships.  The same 
cannot be said (at least consistently) for non-traditional families.  Therefore, if 
a local government prescribes to the theory that groups of inter-connected 
individuals (to the exclusion of individuals residing in a fraternity or boarding 
house) pose less of a burden on society than groups that are not so connected, 
limiting their definition of “family” to related individuals is administratively 
manageable.  If they expand their definition past the traditional family and into 
the “functional family” or “bona fide single housekeeping unit,” local 
governments will find themselves having to make subjective case-by-case 
determinations every time there might be an issue regarding compliance with 
the statute.  It would undoubtedly be more time efficient and cost effective to 
limit their definitions to related individuals and some limited number of 
unrelated individuals.  This argument is bolstered by courts that have 
recognized that the traditional family will usually not exceed the numerical 
limits placed on unrelated individuals.134  However, it is questionable if 
administrative efficiency would save a restrictive definition from being 
arbitrary and unreasonable. 
This subsection has established that the practical justifications for a local 
government’s restrictive definition of “family” are arguably arbitrary and 
unreasonable.  This conclusion is based on the lack of connection between the 
ends, which are clearly legitimate, and the means employed, which tend to be 
over-inclusive.  The next subsection will analyze justifications based on the 
preservation of the traditional family. 
 
 134. See Richards, supra note 122, at 774 (“[I]t is argued that traditional-family ordinances 
will prevent overcrowding because traditional families tend to be self-limiting and unrelated 
groups do not.”).  But see Adamson, 610 P.2d at 441 (city’s presentation of data on the average 
size of traditional families coupled with the argument that “related groups tend to have a natural 
limit, making a legal limit unnecessary” was found unpersuasive). 
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2. Justifications for Distinguishing Between Related and Unrelated 
Individuals Based on the Preservation of the Traditional Family Are 
Not Arbitrary and Unreasonable 
Having established that the practical justifications offered by local 
governments for distinguishing between related and unrelated individuals in 
zoning definitions of “family” are arguably arbitrary and unreasonable, 
justifications based on the preservation of the traditional family must now be 
examined.  As will be discussed below, restrictive definitions of “family” are 
often justified on concepts such as “sanctity of the family” and “preserving 
traditional family values.”  Concern over the deterioration of the “traditional 
family” is not a new phenomenon.  As early as the 1960s, there was 
“considerable debate over what government could do to ‘shore up’ the ‘fragile’ 
family.”135  Even in the last couple years, there has been considerable debate 
over preserving the traditional family through preserving the traditional notion 
of marriage.136  A review of opinions from the United States Supreme Court, 
Missouri courts, and other state courts in Parts III.B.2.a, b, and c respectively, 
will shed light on these justifications. 
a. United States Supreme Court Decisions 
The United States Supreme Court first considered a local government’s 
ability to distinguish between related and unrelated individuals in the zoning 
context in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.137  In Boraas, the Court upheld a 
definition of “family” which was restricted to persons related by blood, 
adoption, or marriage or to two unmarried and unrelated individuals.138  Justice 
Douglas, writing for the majority, found a “quiet place where yards are wide, 
people few, and motor vehicles restricted” as “legitimate guidelines in a land 
use project addressed to family needs.”139  He went on to say: “The police 
power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places.  It is 
ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of 
quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.”140 
In Boraas, there is some discussion of the practical justifications discussed 
above (noise, limited density, and automobiles); however, there is also 
 
 135. RICHARD J. GELLES, CONTEMPORARY FAMILIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW 24 (1995). 
 136. See, e.g., Bronwen McShea, IMAPP POLICY BRIEF: THE SENATE MARRIAGE DEBATE: A 
SUMMARY (2004) (providing excerpts of speeches from senators both for and against the Federal 
Marriage Amendment), available at http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/SenateDebatePB.pdf. 
 137. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 138. Id. at 2, 10.  The definition at issue in Boraas is even more restrictive than that in Black 
Jack.  Compare id. at 2 (Village of Belle Terre ordinance), with Petition, supra note 1, at 3. 
 139. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 9. 
 140. Id. 
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consideration of “family needs,” “family values,” and “youth values.”141  The 
Supreme Court’s protection of the traditional family was confirmed three years 
later in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.142  In Moore, the Court struck down a 
zoning ordinance that limited the definition of “family” to relatives within a 
certain degree of kinship.143  The Court, in striking down the statute, rejected 
the local government’s practical justifications, namely “preventing 
overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding undue 
financial burden on the city’s school system,” as being too attenuated from the 
means employed.144  Rather, the Court stated that the “sanctity of the family” 
(here, the extended family) is protected “because the institution of the family is 
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”145  The Court went on to 
state that “[i]t is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of 
our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”146  Like Boraas, protection of 
the traditional family is evident. 
b. Missouri Decisions 
The desire of Missouri courts to protect the traditional family was made 
overwhelmingly clear in City of Ladue v. Horn.147  In Horn, an unmarried 
couple had purchased a seven-bedroom home in the City of Ladue, Missouri, a 
suburb of St. Louis.148  The couple resided in the home with their three 
children,149 however, the city demanded they vacate because “their household 
did not comprise a family, as defined by Ladue’s zoning ordinance.”150  
Ladue’s zoning ordinance defined “family” as “[o]ne or more persons related 
by blood, marriage or adoption, occupying a dwelling unit as an individual 
housekeeping unit.”151  In upholding the definition, the court stated: 
There is no doubt that there is a governmental interest in marriage and in 
preserving the integrity of the biological or legal family.  There is no 
concomitant governmental interest in keeping together a group of unrelated 
persons, no matter how closely they simulate a family.  Further, there is no 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 143. Id. at 499–500. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 503. 
 146. Id. at 503–04. 
 147. 720 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
 148. Id. at 747. 
 149. None of the children were the biological offspring of both parents.  Id.  Two of the 
children were in college and only lived in the home part-time.  Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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state policy which commands that groups of people may live under the same 
roof in any section of a municipality they choose.152 
Missouri courts have indicated some willingness to adopt a more 
functional definition of “family,” but only in cases involving handicapped 
individuals.  In Blevins v. Barry-Lawrence County Association for Retarded 
People, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted a functional definition of 
“family” to allow eight mentally handicapped individuals and two functional 
“parents” to be considered a “family,” none of whom were related.153  The 
court in Blevins relied heavily on a decision from the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court where the court was “loathe to restrict a family unit to that composed of 
persons who are related, one to another, by consanguinity or affinity.”154  
However, in the case of handicapped individuals, there is a well-recognized 
competing policy interest, namely the protection of such individuals.  The 
same policy interest is not present in the non-traditional family. 
c. Decisions from Other States 
There are many decisions from other states evaluating the validity of 
restrictive definitions of “family.”  Although these decisions are not controlling 
authority in Missouri, they are illustrative of the justifications based on the 
preservation of the traditional family.  Further, due to the limited Missouri case 
law available, decisions in other states may prove persuasive in Missouri 
courts.  Given the substantial case law among the states on this issue, the 
review of state decisions below is meant only to highlight some of the 
justifications based on the preservation of the traditional family.  Some states, 
like Missouri, have upheld restrictive definitions of “family” when applied to 
non-traditional families while other states have invalidated definitions on 
various grounds. 
New Hampshire and Nebraska are among the states that have upheld 
restrictive definitions of “family.”  Further, these states are illustrative of the 
type of justifications based on the preservation of the traditional family that are 
utilized when upholding these definitions.  For example, in upholding a 
restrictive definition of “family,” the New Hampshire Supreme Court said: 
“There is no doubt that the State has an interest in marriage and the welfare of 
family members.”155  The court continued: 
If an unrelated household group exceeds the designated density requirement it 
is by voluntary action of the group.  The blood related family by its natural 
growth may become in excess of the density limit.  The State has no particular 
interest in keeping together a certain group of unrelated persons.  The State has 
 
 152. Horn, 720 S.W.2d at 752. 
 153. 707 S.W.2d 407, 410–11 (Mo. 1986). 
 154. Id. at 410 (quoting Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Okla. 1985)). 
 155. Town of Durham v. White Enters., 348 A.2d 706, 709 (N.H. 1975). 
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a clear interest, however, in preserving the integrity of the biological or legal 
family.  The promotion of this legitimate government purpose justifies the 
exclusion of a blood related family from the density requirements of the 
ordinance which applies to an unrelated household.  Hence the classification is 
not invidious or arbitrary and is constitutional.  It is to be noted that many 
blood related families by their natural composition will meet the density 
requirements placed on unrelated groups.156 
The Nebraska Supreme Court expressed similar rationale for their decision 
to uphold a restrictive definition of “family” in State v. Champoux.157  In 
Champoux, the local government argued its restrictive definition of “family” 
preserved the “sanctity of the family.”158  The court agreed, however, with 
little discussion of its rationale, simply stating “the city . . . enacted a zoning 
ordinance clearly within the ambit of its police power and defined ‘family’ in a 
way that is rationally related to its legitimate objective of preserving the 
sanctity of the family . . . .”159  The concurrence by Justice Gerrard provides 
more insight into the “sanctity of the family” being a legitimate government 
interest.  In response to an argument that “the lack of a biological or a marital 
relationship between residents of a dwelling does not necessarily lead to the 
creation of problems in a residential neighborhood or a predisposition to 
transiency,” Justice Gerrard replied by saying “the fact that some families and 
certain individuals differ with respect to their habits and conduct in relation to 
the community does not render invalid the overall legislative judgment on how 
this type of occupancy will affect family life in residential neighborhoods as a 
whole.”160 
Even states that have been at the forefront of invalidating restrictive 
definitions of “family,” such as California, New Jersey, and Michigan, have 
recognized that preservation of the traditional family is a legitimate state 
concern.  For example, in response to the local government’s argument that its 
restrictive definition of “family” was intended to “preserve the ‘family’ 
character of [certain] neighborhoods,” the New Jersey Supreme Court 
conceded in State v. Baker that “governments are free to designate certain 
areas as exclusively residential and may act to preserve a family style of 
living.” 161  However, the court went on to hold that the means utilized to meet 
this legitimate goal were too attenuated.162  In his dissent, Justice Mountain 
 
 156. Id. (citations omitted). 
 157. 566 N.W.2d 763 (Neb. 1997). 
 158. Id. at 767. 
 159. Id. at 768; see also Charter Twp. of Delta v. Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d 831, 843 (Mich. 1984) 
(“That government can classify, draw lines around, and support the biological family is well 
settled, as evidenced by our tax and inheritance laws.”). 
 160. Champoux, 566 N.W.2d at 770 (Gerrard, J., concurring). 
 161. 405 A.2d 368, 371 (N.J. 1979). 
 162. The court stated: 
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also acknowledged the traditional family calling it “one of the greatest and 
finest of our institutions,”  continuing that “[t]he family should be entitled—as 
until now it has been—to stand on its own in a distinctively preferred 
position.”163  Similarly, in Michigan the state supreme court recognized the 
importance of the family, however, it also recognized functional families. 
[T]he family, while undergoing dramatic changes in the last half-century, 
remains a fundamental building block of society.  This is true whether we 
speak of the traditional family or the modern concept of a functional 
family . . . .  To say that a family is so equivalent to a ragtag collection of 
college roommates as to require identical treatment in zoning decisions defies 
the reality of the place of the family in American society, despite any changes 
that institution has undergone in recent years.  Only the most cynical among us 
would say that the American family has devolved to the point of no greater 
importance or consideration in governmental decision making than a group of 
college roommates.164 
Lastly, in a dissenting opinion to Santa Barbara v. Adamson, Justice Manuel of 
the California Supreme Court observed: 
[T]here is a long recognized value in the traditional family relationship which 
does not attach to the “voluntary family”.  The traditional family is an 
institution reinforced by biological and legal ties which are difficult, or 
impossible, to sunder.  It plays a role in educating and nourishing the young 
which, far from being “voluntary”, is often compulsory.  Finally, it has been a 
means, for uncounted millennia, of satisfying the deepest emotional and 
physical needs of human beings.165 
The above survey of opinions from the United States Supreme Court, 
Missouri courts, and other state courts serves to highlight the importance of the 
“family” in American jurisprudence.  Even when invalidating a statute, courts 
often concede that the preservation of the traditional family is a legitimate 
interest of state and local governments.  Therefore, even if the practical 
justifications discussed in Part III.B.1 above are found arbitrary and 
 
[Z]oning [may not] be used as a tool to regulate the internal composition of housekeeping 
units . . . .  A municipality must draw a careful balance between preserving family life and 
prohibiting social diversity. 
The fatal flaw in attempting to maintain a stable residential neighborhood through the use 
of criteria based upon biological or legal relationships is that such classifications operate 
to prohibit a plethora of uses which pose no threat to the accomplishment of the end 
sought to be achieved.  Moreover, such a classification system legitimizes many uses 
which defeat that goal. 
Id. 
 163. Id. at 380 (Mountain, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 164. Stegeman v. City of Ann Arbor, 540 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). 
 165. 610 P.2d 436, 446 (Cal. 1980) (Manuel, J., dissenting) (quoting Palo Alto Tenants Union 
v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 911 (N.D. Cal. 1970)). 
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unreasonable, local governments can bolster their argument with justifications 
based on the preservation of the traditional family.  However, case law 
justifying restrictive definitions based on the preservation of the traditional 
family rarely goes beyond a discussion of the history and tradition of the 
“family” in America.  The next section will examine available social data and 
commentary, which suggests that the local governments can offer additional 
justifications for a restrictive definition of “family.” 
C. Should the Preservation of the Traditional Family Be a Valid Justification 
for Restrictive Definitions of “Family”? 
Although the language varies with respect to the preservation of the 
traditional family, the message is the same.  Protection of the traditional family 
is a valid concern of local governments.166  Not only does this contention 
garner wide support from the history and tradition of the family in American 
society, but local governments can also point to substantial social data and 
commentary indicating the preservation of the traditional family confers other 
benefits on society. 
1. Social Data and Commentary Which Indicate the Traditional Family 
Is Worth Preserving 
As stated above, courts do not generally discuss social science data and 
commentary that could potentially bolster a local government’s argument that 
a restrictive definition of “family” is in the best interests of the community.  
However, social data and commentary exist that indicate the preservation of 
the traditional family would reduce violence, crime, and drug use, or, 
alternatively, would positively impact the lives of children through increased 
emotional stability and better academic performance.  Reference to this social 
data and commentary would greatly enhance a local government’s argument 
that it is justified in protecting traditional families through zoning legislation. 
There has long been concern that the traditional family is deteriorating.167  
Further, concern regarding the deterioration of the traditional family and the 
attendant adverse impact on society is recognized worldwide.168  Social 
scientists and other observers have produced a wide array of social data and 
 
 166. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 167. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. 
 168. REBECCA O’NEILL, CIVITAS, EXPERIMENTS IN LIVING: THE FATHERLESS FAMILY 7–9 
(2002) (identifying emotional and mental problems, trouble in school, trouble getting along with 
others, health problems, increased drug use, and increased crime and violence as consequences 
from children being raised without a father in the United Kingdom); Jessica Hardung, The 
Proposed Revisions to Japan’s Juvenile Law: If Punishment is Their Answer, They Are Asking the 
Wrong Question, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 139, 150 (2000) (citing the breakdown of the 
traditional family as a cause of the increase in juvenile crime rates in Japan). 
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other commentary supporting the premise that the preservation of the 
traditional family helps contribute to a stable society.169  A sampling of this 
data and commentary, discussed below, establishes a connection between the 
deterioration of the traditional family and an increase in crime, violence, drug 
use, emotional instability of youth, uninsured individuals, and bankruptcy. 
Many experts argue that the decline of the traditional family is a major 
cause of high crime rates.170  Statistics such as the percentage of the population 
divorced171 and percentage of unattached individuals have a strong correlation 
to crime rates.172  Further, the breakdown of the traditional family has been 
identified as one of the root causes of violence among children.173  Indicative 
of this social data is The Real Root Causes of Violent Crime: The Breakdown 
of Marriage, Family and Community produced by the Heritage Foundation.174  
This report establishes the connection between crime (specifically violent 
crime and juvenile crime) and the breakdown of the traditional family, 
particularly abandonment by fathers.175  Another commentator, Bridget Maher, 
also argues that the breakdown of the traditional family contributes to crime, 
drug use, and delinquency among children.176  Maher cites a 1999 study of 
more than 4,000 youth finding that “those who experience one or more 
changes in family structure during adolescence were at much greater risk for 
 
 169. The social data and commentary discussed in this Comment admittedly do not cover the 
full spectrum of data available.  They do, however, indicate that data exist that local governments 
can use to meet the fairly debatable standard. 
 170. NORVAL GLENN, COUNCIL ON FAMILIES, INST. FOR AM. VALUES, CLOSED HEARTS, 
CLOSED MINDS: THE TEXTBOOK STORY OF MARRIAGE 11 (1997). 
 171. This is not to say, however, that just because an individual is single or divorced or, 
alternatively, a father has abandoned a family, that the resulting family structure would not meet a 
local government’s definition of “family.”  Rather, this social data and commentary is presented 
only to establish that a local government is justified in promulgating legislation that preserves the 
traditional family. 
 172. GLENN, supra note 170. 
 173. See JAMES ALAN FOX, TRENDS IN JUVENILE VIOLENCE: A REPORT TO THE UNITED 
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL ON CURRENT AND FUTURE RATES OF JUVENILE OFFENDING 2–3 
(1996) (citing the breakdown of the traditional family as one of the causes of juvenile violence); 
Thomas F. Geraghty & Steven A. Drizin, Charting a New Course for Juvenile Justice: Listening 
to Outsiders, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363, 370 (1999) (book review). 
 174. Patrick F. Fagan, The Real Root Causes of Violent Crime: The Breakdown of Marriage, 
Family, and Community, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, Mar. 17, 1995. at 1–2. 
 175. Id.  “[A]t the heart of the explosion of crime in America is the loss of the capacity of 
fathers and mothers to be responsible in caring for the children they bring into the world.”  Id. at 
2.  Marriage also “curbs social problems such as domestic violence, which is much more common 
among cohabitants than among spouses.”  Bridget Maher, Why Marriage Should be Privileged in 
Public Policy, INSIGHT, Apr. 23, 2003, available at http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=IS03D1. 
 176. Maher, supra note 175 (citing TERRENCE P. THORNBERRY ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  FAMILY DISRUPTION AND 
DELINQUENCY, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Sept. 1999)). 
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drug use and delinquency.”177  Maher also cites a 1998 Department of Justice 
report which “reveals that six out of ten jail inmates in the U.S. were raised by 
a single parent or neither parent.”178  Other commentators also point to “recent 
research [which] strongly suggests that family structure is an important 
predictor of crime and delinquency.”179 
Statistics also indicate that the preservation of the traditional family has a 
positive impact on children.180  For example, data show that children from 
divorced families have nearly a forty percent chance of being moderately or 
severely depressed.181  Examining children ten years after a divorce, males 
“were found to be generally unhappy and lonely” and females were “overcome 
by fear and anxiety at the prospect of making an emotional commitment to a 
man.”182  Furthermore, and somewhat related to the issues with crime and 
violence discussed above, 
[t]he common belief that parental divorce poses long-term hazards for the 
children involved is supported by [an] analysis of longitudinal data from . . . a 
nationally representative sample of American youth . . . . Effects of marital 
discord and family disruption were visible twelve to twenty-two years later in 
poor relationships with parents, and [there is] an increased likelihood of 
dropping out of high school and receiving psychological help.183 
Lastly, “current research suggests that an intact marriage in itself appears to 
make a positive difference in a child’s well-being.”184  Recent academic 
research indicates that “[t]he weakening of [the] U.S. family structure in recent 
decades, driven primarily by high and rising rates of unwed childbearing and 
divorce, has almost certainly weakened the educational prospects and 
achievements of U.S. children.”185  Other commentators contend that the 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. INST. FOR MARRIAGE AND PUB. POL’Y, IMAPP POLICY BRIEF: CAN MARRIED PARENTS 
PREVENT CRIME? RECENT RESEARCH ON FAMILY STRUCTURE AND DELINQUENCY 2000–2005, 
at 4 (2005), available at http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/imapp.crimefamstructure.pdf. 
 180. Better emotional and physical health, longer life spans, and greater incomes are also 
cited as benefits for adults from marriage.  Maher, supra note 175. 
 181. GELLES, supra note 135, at 410. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Glenn T. Stanton, The Broken Promises of Divorce: How Divorce Hurts Children and 
Adults, http://www.divorcereform.org/mel/apsychdivorce.html (quoting Nicholas Zill et al., 
Long-Term Effects of Parental Divorce on Parent Child Relationships, Adjustment and 
Achievement in Young Adulthood, 7 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 91, 99–100 (1993)). 
 184. GLENN, supra note 170, at 12; see also O’NEILL, supra note 168; Reni Winter, A 
Strengthening of Vows: Vancleave Church to Consider New Idea, SUN HERALD, Mar. 18, 2002, 
at A2 (discussing Louisiana state representative’s assertion that violent crimes committed by 
children and teen suicide are symptoms of the breakdown of the traditional family). 
 185. CTR. FOR MARRIAGE AND FAMILIES, INST. FOR AM. VALUES, RESEARCH BRIEF NO. 1:  
FAMILY STRUCTURE AND CHILDREN’S EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES 5 (2005) (linking college 
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“overwhelming amount of social science data shows that children raised by 
their biological married parents have the best chance of becoming happy, 
healthy, responsible, morally-upright citizens.”186  Further, “children with 
married parents fare better economically and experience greater educational 
success than do those with unmarried parents.”187 
Social data and commentary also demonstrate that the preservation of the 
traditional family helps communities in various other ways.  For example, 
social data indicate that unmarried couples are more likely to lack medical 
insurance.188  This could arguably correspond to greater public assistance (in 
the form of state medical care) for these individuals.  Additionally, “[m]arried 
adults are more likely to engage in civic activities, such as voting and 
community involvement,” especially volunteer work in social service 
projects.189  Lastly, divorce is also a main cause of bankruptcy. 190 
As a final point, some commentators argue that the broken family is self-
perpetuating.191  That is, those coming from a broken family are more likely to 
breed broken families in their adult lives.  Maher cites a 2001 study positing 
“children from divorced homes are twice as likely to divorce as are children 
from intact homes.”192 
In conclusion, social data and commentary exist that arguably justify local 
governments in making the preservation of the traditional family a legislative 
goal: crime is reduced; children are emotionally happier; more individuals are 
insured and engaged civically; fewer individuals are filing for bankruptcy; and 
the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community are enhanced. 
b. Counter Arguments 
Valid counter arguments can be made in response to the discussion above.  
First, by excluding non-traditional families from single-family zoning districts, 
children are being punished for their parents’ decisions.  The welfare of 
children is, therefore, a competing policy interest and is one that has received 
 
attendance, misbehavior at school, drug use, illegal activities and psychological problems with 
the weakening of the U.S. family structure), available at http://www.americanvalues.org/ 
pdfs/researchbrief1.pdf. 
 186. Maher, supra note 175. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Kristen Gerencher, Unmarried Couples More Likely to Be Without Health Insurance, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2006, at D4. 
 189. Maher, supra note 175. 
 190. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 120 (5th ed. 2006) (citing divorce and medical 
problems as the leading causes of consumer bankruptcy behind income loss). 
 191. Maher, supra note 175. 
 192. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] DEFINITION OF “FAMILY” IN MISSOURI LOCAL ZONING ORDINANCES 665 
endorsement from the United States Supreme Court.193  However, it is not 
uncommon to treat a small segment of society in a way that may seem unfair to 
effectuate broader societal goals. 
Second, like the counter argument to the practical justifications of 
restrictive definitions of zoning discussed above, the use of zoning ordinances 
is a very indirect way of preserving the traditional family.  How effective is a 
restrictive definition of “family” to the preservation of the traditional family?  
Is the exclusion of non-traditional families really supporting “family values”?  
As the Michigan Supreme Court stated in Charter Township of Delta v. 
Dinolfo: 
Our decision here is not in derogation of the cultural, economic, and moral 
value of the traditional family and its essential and unique role in our society, 
but rather is based on the fact that the exclusion of groups such as defendants 
from a residential neighborhood is not in any way supportive of “family 
values”.  Ironically, the enforcement of this ordinance prohibits the two 
defendant nuclear families from adding to their numbers in a way they choose 
pursuant to the highest possible motives.194 
Therefore, preservation of traditional family values might not be best 
effectuated through the zoning code.  After all, the denial of housing for all 
residents, at least with respect to a certain district, is seemingly a steep price to 
pay to preserve the traditional family. 
D. Author’s Analysis 
This Comment has established the following: (1) local governments have 
the power to define “family”; (2) the standard of judicial review for a local 
government’s definition of “family” is very deferential to the government; (3) 
local governments can refer to both practical justifications and justifications 
based on the preservation of the traditional family to support a restrictive 
definition of “family”; and (4) significant social data and commentary exist 
which support the government’s justifications.  In light of what has been 
established, it is unlikely those adversely affected in Missouri by a restrictive 
definition of “family” will be able to obtain judicial relief.  The standard of 
review is simply too deferential toward local governments for a restrictive 
definition to not be considered “fairly debatable.”  As such, those adversely 
 
 193. One of the important distinctions between the Court’s decision in Moore when compared 
to Boraas is that “[t]he customary family structure of adults and children, with the adults in a 
supervisory role, was absent in Boraas.”  Developments in the Law of Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
1427, 1572 (1978) (footnote omitted).  Additionally, “in a case decided shortly after Moore, the 
Court indicated that even if there is no biological or marital bond, relationships involving close 
emotional attachments and the nurturing of children are entitled to some protection.”  Id. (citing 
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842–45 (1977)). 
 194. 351 N.W.2d 831, 843 (Mich. 1984). 
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affected are limited to the political solutions that proved successful in Black 
Jack.  Despite this being unfortunate for those in living arrangements that 
closely resemble a traditional family, it does place the burden of social 
decisions on the legislature, where it belongs.  This is the way it should be.  In 
the words of Justice Mountain, “[T]he whole point is that the legislators and 
the people whom they represent should have the right to the final word.  This is 
what democracy is all about.”195 
Over time, the views of local communities, and America as a whole, 
evolve.  If courts step in and are too willing to overturn legislative decisions, 
they preempt this evolution.  With respect to restrictive definitions of “family” 
in local zoning ordinances, courts should be especially hesitant to get involved.  
Not only are there practical justifications for restrictive definitions, there is 
widespread judicial agreement that the preservation of the traditional family is 
a legitimate goal of local governments.  Moreover, local governments can rely 
on substantial social data and commentary further supporting this justification.  
It must be kept in mind that local legislators have a tough job.  It is unlikely 
they can promulgate any land use legislation that will please everyone.  The 
best they can do is promulgate land use legislation that best reflects the desires 
of their constituents while fulfilling their responsibilities as legislators.  When 
change is needed, it will come through the political process as it did in Black 
Jack.  Legislators must be able to do their job without fear of being preempted 
or overturned by activist courts implementing their personal views. 
Further, those adversely impacted by restrictive definitions of “family” do 
not need judicial protection.  First, they are not being denied housing generally 
or even housing in a specific city.  They are only being denied housing in a 
specific district within a city.  Second, those adversely impacted by a 
restrictive definition are a diverse group with distinct characteristics.  They are 
not a discrete group whose needs can be easily addressed.  Rather, they are a 
hodgepodge of all those who fall outside the definition.  As such, providing 
judicial relief would be difficult, requiring courts to analyze various factual 
scenarios and make case-by-case determinations.  Third, there is no reason to 
think local legislators cannot be responsible and responsive to the plight of 
those adversely affected.  As demonstrated in Black Jack, non-traditional 
families can generate substantial popular support, which in turn generates 
legislative responses.  Legislators may even be part of non-traditional families 
themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
One does not need to look wide or far in today’s world to find examples of 
living arrangements that do not comport with the concept of a traditional 
 
 195. State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368, 378 (N.J. 1979) (Mountain, J., dissenting). 
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family.  As such, debate and litigation over what constitutes a “family” will 
occur with increasing frequency in the future.  At the forefront of this debate is 
the definition of “family” in local zoning ordinances.  Restrictions in zoning 
ordinances literally hit close to home, by limiting the choice of individuals 
with respect to where they live.  This Comment has established that providing 
a definition of “family” is well within the power of local governments.  
Additionally, local governments have numerous arguments, supported by 
social data and commentary, which justify the use of restrictive definitions of 
“family.”  Therefore, in light of the above, success in Missouri courts is 
unlikely for those adversely affected.  A political solution, attained by pressure 
on the local legislatures, is the best, if not the only, remedy for those excluded. 
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